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I. INTRODUCTION
It is clear that during the last twenty years there has been a
tremendous revolution in landlord-tenant law, particularly with respect to residential property. If the old law, as it was argued,' was
biased in favor of the landlord, then the new law is perhaps just as
patently so in favor of the tenant. In fact, it has been said that the
law as it now stands tends to regulate residential landlords much
as it does public utilities. 2 This sea-change in the rules toward tenant protection has met with the overwhelming critical acclaim of
the commentators. 3 Whether as a matter of policy the new protenant rules make any more sense than the old pro-landlord rules
is the subject of this article. I will first briefly sketch both the old
and the new rules. I will then compare the new rules with public
1. See, e.g., J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 198 (2d ed. 1975).
2. In Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge
Robb dissented to the majority view that a landlord seeking to evict his tenant for nonpayment of rent must show that he is financially unable to make
repairs, or show other substantial business reasons for taking the property off
the market where the tenant is claiming that the eviction is retaliatory. He
said:
The theory of the majority seems to be that if not an outlaw a
landlord is at least a public utility, subject to regulation by the court
in conformity with its concept of public convenience and necessity. I
reject that notion, which in practical application will commit to the
discretion of a jury the management of a landlord's business and
property.
Id. at 871. See also C. Berger, A Public Utility View of Rental Housing, 50 PA.
B.A.Q. 234 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Daniel, Judicialand Legislative Remediesfor SubstandardHousing:
Landlord-TenantLaw Reform in the Districtof Columbia, 59 GEO. I.J. 909,
93043 (1971); Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and the Implied Warrantyof Habitability,4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 49, 63-66 (1970); Note, JudicialExpansion of
Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warrantiesof Habitabilityand Safety
in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL I. REV. 489, 495-501 (1971); Note,
Landlord's Violation of Housing Code During Lease Term is Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability ConstitutingPartialor Total Defense to an
Eviction Action Based on Nonpayment of Rent, 84 HARv. L REV. 729 (1971).
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utility doctrine and examine whether they accord with notions of
fairness and efficiency.
I. THE OLD LAW
A. The Doctrine of Independent Covenants Generally
Much of the common law of landlord-tenant can be traced to an
old dogma-that a lease of realty was deemed predominantly a
conveyance of an interest in land rather than a contractual arrangement between two parties, and that therefore the general law
of contracts did not apply. In contract law, the doctrine of independent covenants had been repudiated by Lord Mansfield in
Kingston v. Preston4 in 1773. But it took almost an additional 200
years for landlord-tenant law to begin to reach a similar conclusion. The doctrine of independent covenants was that the failure
to perform a promise by one party did not excuse performance of
the counter promise by the other party, unless the contract specifically so provided. Thus, if an employer contracted to hire an employee for one year at a certain salary, the employee could recover
the salary even though he never did a day's work.5 Of course, the
employee would also be liable in damages for his own failure to
perform. What Lord Mansfield did was to say that such promises
should be dependent. In the case stated above, that would mean
that the employer should not be liable for the agreed salary unless
the employee performed his end of the bargain.
As noted, landlord-tenant law did not follow general contract
principles with respect to this question. The reason given was that
a lease was regarded as a transfer of an interest in land rather than
as a contract containing mutual promises, and therefore the new
contract doctrine of dependence did not apply. The fact that lease
covenants continued to be deemed independent had a substantial
effect on the practical affairs of landlords and tenants. It is probably fair to say that overall, though with some major exceptions, application of the rule tended to favor the landlords. Let us examine
briefly the various effects.
First, breach by the landlord of an obligation expressly imposed
upon him by the lease did not excuse the tenant from paying rent.
For example, if the landlord breached his covenant to repair,6 or to
pay taxes on the premises, 7 or even to rebuild them if destroyed, 8
4. This case was noted in Jones v. Barkley, 99 Eng. Rep. 437-38 (KB. 1781).

5. Anonymous, Y.B. Pasch. 15 Hen. 7, L 10b, pl 7 (1500), noted in J. MURRAY,
CONTRACTS § 155, at 302 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
6. Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938); Stewart v. Childs Co., 86

N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (1914).
7. Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 191 N.E. 651 (1934).
8. Tyson v. Wel, 169 Ala. 558, 53 So. 912 (1910).
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the tenant's rent liability continued. In such case, of course, the
tenant had a right to recover damages for the landlord's breach
9
even though the tenant was himself in arrears on the rent.
Second, as a general proposition, failure of the tenant to pay the
rent,10 or his breach of other covenants," did not excuse the landlord's liability to perform. That is, the landlord would still have an
obligation not to disturb the tenant's possession and as a matter of
law could not evict the tenant for the breach.
Thus, on its face, the doctrine of independent covenants operated symmetrically: breach by either party did not excuse
counterperformance by the other. But by necessity, the doctrine
soon was eroded in favor of landlords in some cases and tenants in
others, and it can be argued that as a result of these changes the
symmetry was more apparent than real. In favor of the landlord
there were two operating factors. First, since the rule of independent covenants operated only where the lease was silent on the subject, and since leases were ordinarily drafted by or for landlords, it
became customary to provide that breach by the tenant of his lease
obligations would be grounds for termination at the landlord's option. Second, statutes were passed in virtually every state that
provided for a summary procedure to evict a tenant who failed to
pay the rent as due. 12 Thus, landlords were protected from the
harsh application of the old rules. Many tenants, on the other
hand, did not know or have enough bargaining power to provide
similar protection for themselves by way of lease provisions.
Moreover, there were no statutes providing that breach of a subby the landlord excused tenants from
stantial obligation
3
performance.1
Nevertheless, it would be unfair to say that the common law
system was completely biased against the tenant, for the courts
early developed the theories of actual and constructive eviction
which, though not stated as such, were really substantial limitations upon the independent covenants doctrine. Under the law as
it evolved, the courts held that in every leasing there was an im9. 3A A. CORBmN, CONTRACTS § 686, at 269 n.60 (1960) and cases therein cited.
10. Myles v. Strange, 226 Ala. 49, 145 So. 313 (1932); Standard Live Stock Co. v.
Pentz, 204 Cal. 618, 269 P. 645 (1928).
11. In re Pennewell, 119 F. 139 (6th Cir. 1902) (tenant breached covenant against
sublease).
12. The statutes are collected in 6 S. WMSTON, CONTRACTS § 890B (3d ed. Jaeger
1962).
13. Though there were statutes providing that destruction of the leased premises
would be ground for termination of the lease. See 7 S. WnLLSTON, CoNRACTs
§ 944A (3d ed. Jaeger 1962).
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plied covenant of quiet enjoyment,14 i.e., an engagement that the
tenant's possession would not be disturbed by the landlord, those
claiming under him, or those claiming a title superior to his. As an
example, if the landlord physically invaded the premises forcing
the tenant to leave, this was a breach of implied covenant of quiet
enjoyment and constituted an actual eviction which would be a defense to any action by the landlord for rent accruing after the

wrongful act.15
It was the extension of this notion to less flagrant landlord behavior which the courts characterized as a "constructive" eviction
that is of particular interest here. For there developed the notion
that "where, although there has been no physical expulsion or exclusion of the tenant, the landlord's wrongful acts substantially
and materially deprive the tenant of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises"' 6 and the tenant as a result abandoned possession, this would be deemed a constructive eviction which would
be a defense to an action for rents accruing after the tenant left.
The real catch in the rule lay in the ambiguity of what constituted
those wrongful acts of a landlord which would justify a tenant's
abandonment of the premises. The lay person might, for example,
think that if a landlord were to allow residential premises to fall
into such disrepair as to become uninhabitable, this would be a
sufficient wrongful act. But that was not the law. The courts held
early that there was no implied warranty that the premises were fit
for the purposes let; therefore, the landlord generally had no obligation with respect to habitability.'7 Of course if he committed affirmative acts destructive of habitability (deliberately releasing
vermin on the premises?), that would be sufficient; but needless to
say, such was an unusual case. The doctrine of constructive eviction as applied to passive behavior was limited, then, to situations
where the landlord was said to have a "duty" with respect to the
condition of the premises. Such a duty could be imposed by an
express clause in the lease, or by statute 18 or ordinance. 19 In their
14. 1 AwEmCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.47, at 272 nn.3 & 4 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
Some states required that the technical words "demise" or "grant" be used.

Id.
15. Id. § 3.50.
16. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 83, 256
N.E.2d 707, 710, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1970). Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727
(N.Y. 1826), was probably the first American case that recognized this

doctrine.
17. 1 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 3.45.
18. In a number of states, legislation provided that the residential landlord had
an obligation to provide fit premises. CAL. CrY. CODE § 1941 (West 1954) (first
passed in 1872); 41 OKLA.STAT. ANN.tit. 41, § 31 (West 1951 & Supp. 1980) (first
passed in 1890 and repealed in 1978); S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 43-32-8 (1967)
(first passed in 1877).
19. For a brief history of tenement house ordinances and their enforcement in
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absence, constructive eviction did not apply and therefore, as a
practical matter, residential tenants often lacked protection
against uninhabitable premises.
B.

Destruction of Leased Premises

It was well established at common law that destruction of the
leased premises did not discharge the tenant's liability to pay the
rent.20 Two reasons were traditionally given. First, it was said that
the lease was predominantly a conveyance of an estate in land; the
use of the building was incidental. 2 1 Reasoning from this theory,
the courts in the United States did not apply the general rule
where the lease was of a part of a building or of a building without
the land. 22 A second reason was the traditional independent cove23
nants bugaboo that underlay much of landlord-tenant law.
The old approach seems terribly unjust today. It appears clear
to me that most leases involve a contract where the desire for sheltered space is the dominant motive and that destruction of the
building ought to discharge the tenant's obligation on the theory of
impossibility. Nevertheless, both Professors Williston 24 and
Corbin 25 seem to have defended the old rule. On this issue, the
state legislatures were ahead of the professors, for in most states
statutes were passed giving tenants the option of vacating and terminating their rental obligation.26 It was the legislatures, then,
rather than the courts that took the lead in reforming the law along
lines more in consonance with modern needs.
The Duty to Repair and Rebuild
In the absence of a covenant or statute binding him to do so, the
landlord was under no obligation to the tenant to keep the leased
C.

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

New York City, see Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions
and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254, 1259-81 (1966).
Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441 (1869); Cowell v. Lumley, 39 Cal. 151 (1870);
White v. Molyneux, 2 Ga. 124 (1847); Harris v. Heackman, 62 Iowa 411, 17 N.W.
592 (1883); Roberts v. Lynn Ice Co., 187 Mass. 402, 73 N.E. 523 (1905); Bowen v.
Clemens, 161 Mich. 493, 126 N.W. 639 (1910); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Heikens, 112 Tenn. 378, 79 S.W. 1038 (1904).
Nebraska was one of the few states refusing to follow the common law
rule. Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897).
1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 3.103, at 397 n.4.
Alexander v. Dorsey, 12 Ga. 12 (1852); Womack v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103
(1867); Shawmut Nat'l Bank v. Boston, 118 Mass. 125 (1875); Graves v. Berdan,
26 N.Y. 498 (1863).
6 S. WniTsroN, supra note 12, § 890, at 589 n.5.
Id. § 946.
6 A. CoRIN, CoNTRACTs § 1356 (1962).
For a tabulation of the statutes see 6 S. WILLSTON, supra note 12, § 944A.
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premises in repair.27 The rule was the same whether the premises
were totally destroyed or just needed minor repairs. If repairs
were to be done by the landlord at all, they were done without the
compulsion of law. That is not to say that very substantial repair
obligations were imposed upon the tenant either. His obligation
was merely to refrain from committing permissive waste; that is, to
make those minor repairs necessary to keep the premises wind
and water tight or from deteriorating.2 8 Thus, the tenant was obligated to fix a broken window or replace a missing shingle but not
to replace an entire roof blown off by the elements. The law left to
market forces the decision of whether the last mentioned repair
would be made, and if so, by whom. One would surmise, for example, that the landlord as a practical matter would replace the roof
where the lease was a short-term residential one, but the tenant
would, where it was a long-term commercial net arrangement. The
hands-off approach of the law naturally prompted landlords and
tenants to make their own agreements with respect to the repair
issue. It became customary, therefore, to include a covenant concerning the duty to repair in most leases.
Where the lease imposed a general duty to repair on the tenant,
most courts held that this obligated him to completely rebuild the
premises in the event of their destruction. 29 Some courts reached
the opposite result on the theory that "repair" contemplated the
the
existence of a structure upon which to work.30 In some states,
3
legislature reversed the severe common law rule by statute. '
D.

The Duty to Deliver Possession

Although it was clear that a landlord was liable to his tenant for
damages for his failure to himself vacate the premises in time for
his tenant to take possession at the beginning of the lease, 32 there
has been a split of authority as to whether he was so liable if the
tenant was prevented from entering by the wrongful act of a prior
holdover tenant. Under the so-called American rule, the landlord
33
had only the obligation to give the tenant a valid right to possess;
27. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 3.78, at 346 n.1.

28. Id. at 347 nn.4 & 5.
29. Fowler & Moore v. Payne, 49 Miss. 32 (1873); Chambers v. North River Line,
179 N.C. 199, 102 S.E. 198 (1920); McKinley v. C. Jutte & Co., 230 Pa. 122, 79 A.
244 (1911); Priest v. Foster, 69 Vt. 417, 38 A. 78 (1897).
30. Realty & Rebuilding Co. v. Rea, 184 Cal. 565, 194 P. 1024 (1920); Orient Ins. Co.
v. Pioneer Mill Co., 27 Hawaii 698 (1924); Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal
Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W. 785 (1897).
31. See, e.g., 2A N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-9 (1976).
32. Adair v. Bogle, 20 Iowa 238 (1866).
33. Field v. Herrick, 101 fll. 110 (1881); Pendergast v. Young, 21 N.H. 234 (1850);
Edwards v. McLean, 122 N.Y. 302,25 N.E. 483 (1890); Teitelbaum v. Direct Re-
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under the English rule, the landlord was liable if by the wrongful
34
act of a prior holdover tenant, the tenant could not actually enter.
The argument for the American approach was that a person should
not be vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of a third person. To
many, an approach leaving the new tenant with the obligation to
clear the premises of a prior holdover tenant seems most unjust;
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act reverses this
the Uniform
35
rule.
E. Tenants' Abandonment and the "Duty to Mitigate"
In the law of contracts generally, where there has been a
breach, the injured promisee cannot recover those damages which
36
he could have avoided by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Thus, a wrongfully discharged employee may not recover for lost
wages if he could have secured other comparable employment; his
37
damages are reduced by the amount which he could have earned.
These rules historically did not apply to landlord-tenant law.
When a tenant wrongfully abandoned leased premises, the landlord was free to allow the premises to lie idle and collect the full
rent from the tenant.3 8 He had no "duty to mitigate." To handle
the problems of tenant liability the courts instead developed the
doctrine of acceptance of surrender. Under that approach, when
the tenant abandoned the premises his liability for rent continued
unless the landlord was deemed to have accepted the tenant's surrender. This would occur upon the landlord's reentry and reletting
of the premises. In some states, the landlord could forestall the
discharge of rent liability by sending notice to the tenant of (1) the
reletting, and (2) the landlord's intention to hold the tenant liable
for the balance. 39 In New York, the reletting was deemed an acceptance of surrender unless the tenant consented to the reletof fact as to
ting.40 In other states, the reletting created a4 question
the landlord's intention to accept surrender. 1
alty Co., 172 Misc. 48,13 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va.
356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
34. Cheshire v. Thurston, 70 Ariz. 299, 219 P.2d 1043 (1950); Dilly v. Paynsville
Land Co., 173 Iowa 536, 155 N.W. 971 (1916); Wallace v. Carter, 133 Kan. 303, 299
P. 966 (1931); Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 111 N.W. 359 (1907);
Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 NJ.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936); Oriental Oil Co. v. Lindsey, 33 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).

2.103.
36. J. MuRRAY, supra note 5, § 227.
37. Hollwedel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 263 N.Y. 95, 188 N.E. 266 (1933).
35. UNIFoRM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §

38. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 3.99, at 392 n.16, and cases
therein cited.

39. Id. at 393 n.18.
40. Id. at 393 n.20.
41. Id. at 393 n.19.
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In recent years, the courts have tended to discard these old
rules and have adopted the general contract rule imposing a duty
to mitigate upon the landlord.4 2 The Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act has adopted a similar rule.4 3
F. Summary
What does this review of the old rules show about the so-called
bias of the law for landlords? Perhaps it can be summed up this
way. The purportedly neutral common law doctrines of landlordtenant probably in operation leaned more heavily against the tenant than against the landlord. Nevertheless, by the beginning of
the twentieth century, the courts and legislatures had ameliorated
much of the harshness. The doctrine of constructive eviction had
diluted the most adverse effects of covenant independence, particularly with respect to residential properties where statutory or
municipal obligations of housing fitness had been introduced.
Statutory reform had changed the old rule that destruction of
leased premises did not discharge the obligation to pay rent, as
well as the doctrine that the tenant's general covenant to repair
included the obligation to rebuild. Courts in a number of states
had discarded the old rules on acceptance of surrender and replaced them with the contract notion of mitigation of damages.
However, in the past fifteen to twenty years what has happened
to landlord-tenant law goes much beyond simple reform of the old
rules. It can be fairly said that a revolution of rather major proportions has occurred. I will next examine the outlines and policy implications of the new rules.
III THE NEW LAW
A. Introductory Comments
The most important recent developments in landlord-tenant
rules have been in three major areas: (1) rent and eviction control; (2) anti-condominium conversion legislation; and (3) warranty of habitability rules. Some have argued with approval,"
others with alarm,45 that the result of these developments is that
the landlord is beginning to be treated more and more like a public
utility and less and less like an ordinary business person. Whether
this is true, and if so, whether it is a salutary trend will be examined here by comparing the above developments with their
42. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Seglin, 184 Neb. 673, 171 N.W.2d 247 (1969).
43. UNmFom RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 4.203(c).

44. C. Berger, supra note 2.
45. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robb,
J., dissenting).
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public utility counterparts as well as their respective justifications.
Each development will then be examined to determine whether it
meets criteria of fundamental fairness and economic efficiency.
B.

Price Regulation Versus Rent Control
1. The Background

The prices charged and the profits realized by a public utility
are closely regulated by an administrative agency.4 6 Regulation of
electric, gas, railroad, truck and air rates among others has been a
familiar part of the American scene for a very long time. The historic justification for the imposition of price control on a public
utility was its natural monopoly position. Without such regulation
it would be in a position to charge a price set to maximize its profits. That price would be higher than one where competition existed. The economic argument against this state of affairs was that
where the higher price was charged, too few of the monopolized
item, and more than an optimum of other items would be produced, leading to a lower than optimum total production. Regulation only makes sense, however, where the utility is in a natural
monopoly industry, that is, where "one firm can supply the entire
output demanded at a lower cost than could more than one firm." 47
Otherwise, it would be better to allow entry into the market and let
the price be set by competition.
It is ironic that while deregulation of some of the historically
regulated areas is being seriously discussed or commenced because of the perceived inefficiency of price regulation in situations
where competition could better set the price, rent control is at the
same time being advocated or imposed as the "solution" to the
housing problem in this country. Nevertheless, at the present
time, the trend toward rent control in many places in the United
States is very strong. A short review of the history of this form of
regulation will provide a useful background.
Rent control is and has been a very widely used device throughout the world. One author listed over 100 countries where rent
control legislation had been adopted. 48 If nothing else, this shows
how widespread is the notion that economic forces can be controlled and contained by governmental flat.
Although there is probably no credible evidence of the exist46. See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIoNS
20-63 (1970). The discussion of public utility regulation in the text is derived
from this source.
47. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 252 (2d ed. 1977).
48. Willis, A Short History of Rent ControlLaws, 36 CoRNEL LQ. 54 93-94 (1950).
The historical discussion of rent control in the text is derived from this
source.

LANDLORDS AS PUBLIC UTIITIES
ence of rent control in ancient times, there is a vast amount of data
dating its existence at least back to the Jewish ghetto of sixteenth
century Rome. The Jews were forced to live in a walled area, and
since the number of dwellings therein was limited, the rents
tended to be much higher than in the rest of the city.4 9 Papal rent
control was imposed. Medieval France and Spain also had rent
control regulation.
In the twentieth century, the major impetus for the widespread
enactment of rent control legislation has been war and the housing
shortages often accompanying war's destruction and lack of conwere passed
struction. In the United States, the first such statutes
5
50
after World War I in the District of Columbia and New York. 1
They expired in 1925 and 1928 respectively.
With the advent of World War II, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.52 Under it, residential rent control
was imposed by federal regulation in most cities with populations
over 50,000. There was no similar control over commercial rents.
Limited federal rent control continued until 1954.
New York City has had some form of rent control continuously
since 1943.53 When the federal controls expired, the New York
State Legislature continued them until 1962 when the city was
given authority to maintain them. The city originally applied its
control program only to housing built before 1947. In 1969, however, it extended a new rent "stabilization" program to units built
between 1947 and 1969. Under this program, a board allowed certain increases per year for leases expiring during that year. In
1970, the control system was changed to establish a maximum base
rent designed to allow for proper maintenance and operation of the
housing unit. Rents were allowed to increase seven and one-half
percent per year to reach the base rent figure. Rent control and
stabilization laws continue in New York City to this day.
The 1970's ushered in the tremendous growth of rent control
laws across the United States and the federal government pro49. The discrimination in housing faced by blacks and other minorities forced to
live within modern ghettos accounts for the higher rents that they universally
pay. Limited supply combined with strong demand will inexorably lead to

higher prices.
50. Flood Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act, ch. 80, §§ 101-122, 41
Stat. 297 (1919). This act was extended and amended in 1922 and 1924, and
expired in 1925.
51. Act of Sept. 27, 1920, chs. 942-945, 947, 951, 1920 N.Y. Laws 2477-88. This Act
was extended and amended in 1922, 1924 and 1926, and expired in 1928.
52. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 2, 56 Stat.23 (repealed 1966).
53. The history contained in the text is outlined briefly in Baar, Rent Controlin
the 1970s: The Case of the New Jersey Tenants'Movement, 28 HASTiNGS LJ.
631, 634-36 (1977), and Utt, Rent Controk History's UnlearnedLesson, 8 REAL
EsT. REv. 87, 89 (1978).
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vided the impetus. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon ordered a
ninety day freeze on wages and prices, including rents, under powers granted him by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.54 Phase
II of the control program replaced the original freeze, and provided
for some flexibility in rent increases under a complex set of regulations.55 Federal rent control terminated on January 11, 1973.56
There then arose substantial movements in a number of states to
continue residential rent controls on a local or statewide basis. In
1973, Maryland's legislature passed a statute 57 (which expired in
1974) limiting rent increases to five percent plus increases in certain costs of the landlord. In the same year, Maine passed a local
option law58 modeled after a similar statute 59 passed by Massachusetts for Boston in 1969. In 1973, Congress enacted a statute authorizing rent control in the District of Columbia. 60 Local rent
control is now prevalent in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,
California and elsewhere, and is probably destined to continue to
grow.
2. FederalCase Law on Rent Control
In an era where state economic regulation of business was
under severe challenge as a denial of due process, it is natural that
rent control was also seriously contested. Thus in 1921, soon after
rent controls were first introduced in the United States during and
after World War I, the United States Supreme Court had occasion
to rule upon their validity in the famous case of Block v. Hirsh.61
There a D.C. landlord sought to evict a tenant upon expiration of
his lease. Under a temporary rent control statute passed in D.C. in
1919, the tenant had a right to possession notwithstanding the expiration so long as he continued to pay the original rent. However,
the amount of the rent could be modified by a commission set up
for that purpose. The landlord argued that the statute forbidding
the eviction was unconstitutional. In upholding the statute, the
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
held that the housing emergency caused by the recent war had so
clothed the rental housing business with a "public interest" that a
temporary control of rents was justified. The Court also hinted
that the law, though valid as a temporary emergency measure,
54.
55.
56.
57.

Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1971) (superseded 1971).
6 C.F.R. § 301.102 (1972).
Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3A C.F.R. 150 (1973) (revoked 1974).
Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 794, 1973 Md. Laws 1651 (expired 1974).

58. ME.REV.STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 5371-5376 (1978).

59. Act of Aug. 24, 1969, ch. 797, 1969 Mass. Acts 726.
60. District of Columbia Rent Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-157, 87 Stat. 623.
61. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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might not be if it were a permanent one. The case was decided
against a background of due process case law that forbade state
economic regulation of a business unless it was "affected with a
public interest."6 2 In deciding as it did, however, the Court chose
to ignore a doctrine applicable to utility rate regulation which it
might have applied by analogy. That doctrine held that the regulated party was entitled, as a matter of due process, to rates sufficient to yield a fair return on the fair value of the assets being
63
used.
In 1934, in Nebbia v. New York,64 a case involving the validity of
a New York statute fixing milk prices, the United States Supreme
Court abandoned the old substantive due process standard that
states could not regulate a business unless it was affected with a
public interest. Under the new approach, such regulation would be
invalid only if it had no reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, or were arbitrary or discriminatory. In 1941, the Court, in
Olsen v. Nebraska ex. rel. Western Reference & Bond Association,
Inc.,65 specifically held that it was not necessary to show that there
was an emergency or that the business was affected with a public
interest in order to sustain state regulation of the price an employment agency might charge. The Court said: "We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of ...
legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice
which 'should be left where ... it was left by the Constitution-to
66
the States and to Congress."'
It would seem that Nebbia and Olsen together might just as
well have been applied to rent control as t 9 price control. Under
this view, the emergency requirement of Block v. Hirsh as applied
to rent control would be deemed overruled by the two later price
control cases, and the reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose approach would have been the standard of review.
However, in two subsequent rent control cases, Bowles v. Willingham6 7 and Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,68 the Court sustained the
regulations as emergency exercises of the war power, in effect de62. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
63. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). It should be noted that the fair return
requirement was later overruled in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968). The last case seems to require only that the utility rate not be "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature
is free to adopt." Id. at 769-70.
64. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
65. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
66. Id. at 246 (citation omitted).
67. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
68. 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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clining to deal with the question of whether the Nebbia test would
apply to peacetime rent control.
The Nebbia reasonable relationship test itself was weakened
and attenuated over time. The Court tended to give greater and
greater deference to state legislative judgments. 69 Finally, in Ferguson v. Skrupa,7O the Court seemed to back away completely
from review of economic regulation on substantive due process
grounds. It said: "We refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh
the wisdom of legislation'. . . . Whether the legislature takes for
its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some
71
other is no concern of ours."
Substantive due process as a federal ground for invalidation of
economic regulation was arguably dead.
3. State Case Law on Rent Control and Critique of Courts'
Economic Analysis
Considering all the differing federal approaches over time, it is
no wonder that the state courts have adopted a number of varying
methods for determining the validity of rent control legislation
under substantive due process. Thus there are cases saying that
there must be an emergency to justify such an important limitation upon an owner's rights.72 On the other hand, there are some
others that apply the Nebbia reasonable relationship test. For example, the California Supreme Court said in Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley:73 "It is now settled California law that legislation regulating prices or otherwise restricting contractual or property rights
is within the police power if its operative provisions are reasonably
related to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental
purpose."
Finally, there are courts that have tried to analogize the problem to utility rate regulation. The approach of these is to require
that the regulation permit the landlord to get a reasonable return
on his investment or on the value of his property.74 Thus, at the
present time there is no coherent and unified body of state or federal law on the subject. The problems of analysis have proved
challenging and difficult. I will now turn to a description and criWilliamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Id. at 731-32 (footnote omitted).
E.g., City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
17 Cal. 3d 129, 158, 550 P.2d 1001, 1022, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 496 (1976) (citations
and footnotes omitted).
74. E.g., Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 NJ.
604, 350 A.2d 34 (1975). The New Jersey court later modified its position in
Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978), discussed in
detail below.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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tique of the New Jersey situation to show in detail how one court
has dealt with these problems. New Jersey is particularly interesting because its very extensive system of rent controls has resulted
in a substantial jurisprudence on the subject. The history of how
75
rent controls developed in that state is well described elsewhere.
I will limit the historical description here to a short summary.
In 1957, in Wagner v. Mayor of Newark,7 6 the New Jersey
Supreme Court struck down a rent control ordinance of the city of
Newark on the grounds that the city did not have the power to enact it under the home-rule act, and that the legislature had, in various laws, evinced an intent to preempt local law and to make rent
control a matter of statewide concern. As a result of the holding,
no local rent control ordinances were adopted in New Jersey between 1956 and 1971.
The political landscape was completely changed in 1969 with
the formation of two powerful tenants' organizations in the state in
response to substantially increasing rents. In 1970, the two
merged, forming the New Jersey Tenants Organization with a
membership estimated at 500,000 under the leadership of one Martin Aranow. At first the organization sought statewide rent control
through the legislature. But in 1971 it began seeking rent control
on a local basis in spite of the fact that the supreme court decision
in Wagner seemed to proscribe it. In response to intense political
pressure, city councils in a number of New Jersey municipalities,
including Fort Lee, enacted "rent leveling" ordinances ("control"
apparently having become a dirty word as a result of the disrepute
into which New York City's ordinance had fallen). In Inganamort
v. Borough of Fort Lee, 77 the New Jersey Supreme Court in effect
overruled Wagner and held that the legislature might constitutionally delegate and did so delegate the power to control rents to municipalities, and that the field had not been preempted by state
law. This opened wide the door to rent control on a local basis, and
the political atmosphere was more than ripe for its widespread
adoption. In the ensuing years, over 100 New Jersey municipalities
adopted local rent control, and it is fair to say that the state has
become a veritable laboratory for the development and observation of this device in action.
The New Jersey Supreme Court obviously feels that some limit
must be placed upon the power to regulate rents, but defining just
what that limit should be has proved to be a most demanding task.
75. Baar, supra note 53. The history of New Jersey rent control contained in the
text is derived from this source.
76. 24 N.J. 467, 132 A.2d 794 (1957).
77. 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973).
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Two series of cases in that court show the difficulties it found itself
in once rent control became established.
In the first series of cases known as the Trilogy, 78 the New
Jersey Supreme Court dealt with the constitutionality as a matter
of due process of rent control ordinances in three municipalities.
The ordinances in question allowed automatic rent increases up to
a specified percentage of the increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and further permitted additional amounts to be granted
upon application to a Rent Leveling Board for tax increases, capital improvements, or hardship, where the landlord could not meet
mortgage obligations or maintenance costs. An overall ceiling was
placed on these increases. In holding the ordinances constitutional as a matter of due process, the court laid down the following
principles. First, there is no necessity to justify rent control on the
basis of any emergency or that the activity was affected with a public interest.7 9 Second, the test of Nebbia v. New York governs so
that an economic regulation would be invalid on substantive due
process grounds only if it had no "reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose," or was "arbitrary" or "discriminatory."80
With respect to price regulation, "the question is whether the legislative body could rationally have concluded that the unrestrained operation of the competitive market was not in the public
interest."8' In the rent control area, housing shortages, monopoly
power, substandard housing, or housing deterioration would be
sufficient justification for the ordinance. The presumption is that
the legislative body had such factual support for the ordinance,
and since the challenging plaintiff produced no evidence to the
contrary, the ordinance must be upheld.
Third, the court held the ordinance must not be confiscatory
that is, it must "permit an economically efficient operator to obtain
a just and reasonable' return on his investment,"8 2 except for temporary emergencies as in war where "all individuals might reason8
ably be required to make sacrifices for the common weal." 3
In a long dictum, the court then gave the lower courts guidance
to resolve the question of what is confiscation:
[To determine] whether a rent regulation permits a just and reasonable
78. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 350 A.2d 1
(1975); Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 350 A.2d 19 (1975);
Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604,

350 A.2d 34 (1975).
79. Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council of West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 559-60, 350

80.
81.
82.
83.

A.2d 1, 9 (1975).
Id. at 562-63, 350 A.2d at 11.
Id. at 564, 350 A.2d at 12.
Id. at 568, 350 A.2d at 14.
Id. at 567, 350 A.2d at 14.
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return requires consideration of the value of the rental property, the reasonable expense of operating the property, the income, the rate of return
on the value of the property actually permitted by the rent regulation, and
the minimum rate of return which would be just and reasonable for that
property. Basically, this procedure involves two separate stages of calculations. First, the tribunal must make a factual finding as to the rate of
return on the value of the property which the landlord will in fact receive
under the governing rent leveling ordinance. Second, the tribunal must
make a factual determination as to that rate of return below which an actual rate of return would be confiscatory. This second determination can
be designated as the "just and reasonable" rate of return on the value of a
given rental unit. If the rate of return which the landlord actually receives
falls below the just and84reasonable rate, then the ordinance must be invalidated as confiscatory.

The court thus borrowed heavily from public utility rate regulation for the general approach to the confiscation problem. That is,
it viewed the problem as one of determining rents by applying a
percentage fair return to a rate base. However, it turned to real
estate appraisal authorities for guidance on how to value the property for rate base purposes. It first noted that the premise of rent
control was that the rents were "unfairly inflated" as a result of
market failure caused by "housing shortages, monopoly power,
etc." 85 (This is a premise subject to some dispute but I will discuss
that point later.) The court then pointed out that a valuation based
on these inflated rents would quickly defeat the purpose of rent
control as it would erroneously cause a court to conclude that a
regulation trying to reduce those rents would be confiscatory:
Hence we employ the term "value" in the present context to refer to the
value of the property in a rental housing market free of the aberrant forces
which led to the imposition of controls. Where inflated rents are the result
of a housing shortage, "value" refers to the worth of the property in the
context of a hypothetical market in which the supply of available rental
housing is just adequate to meet the needs of the various categories of
persons actively desiring to rent apartments in the municipality. This
technique of hypothesizing a rental market with comparable levels of supply and demand
has been utilized in English rent control legislation for
86
several years.

The court then noted that the three principal methods of valuing property were all inadequate to the rate-making purpose.
First, the method of capitalizing income, which is the one most
commonly used in the market place, is circular when used for determining the proper rent because it begins with a prediction of
that future rental income to determine value. Next, market value
based on sales of comparable properties is not valid unless the
comparable sales are in a rental market that approximates the hy84. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604,
621-22, 350 A.2d 34, 43 (1975).
85. Id. at 623, 350 A.2d at 44.
86. Id. at 623-24, 350 A.2d at 44 (citation and footnote omitted).
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pothetically adequate market above described. Lastly, the court
noted that depreciated replacement cost was "misleading" when
the "high cost
of construction is a major cause of housing
87
shortages."
The court then left the lower courts completely adrift when it
said:
All of these methods, though, may shed light on the value of the property
as the term is used here, once their deficiencies are recognized. In determining value, the court should take full advantage of the enlightenment
which these methods of valuation may provide, as well as that provided by
any other soundly conceived method which the parties and their expert
suggest such as assessed valuation or original cost
witnesses may
88
depreciated.

When the issue of confiscation finally came up in a real case
three years later, the inadequacies of its prescription by dictum in
the Trilogy cases impressed themselves on the court. In Helmsley
v. Borough of Fort Lee,8 9 the city ordinance allowed annual automatic rent increases equal to the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index but not exceeding two and one-half percent,
plus a tax increase pass-through. In challenging the ordinance as
confiscatory, plaintiffs, major landlords in the town, introduced two
kinds of evidence. First, they showed a history since rent controls
were imposed five years earlier of slightly declining net operating
incomes in thirty-five multiple family buildings with 7,542 apartments comprising eighty-five percent of the rental units in the
town. Plaintiffs then projected what would happen to income if
rent increases continued to be limited to two and one-half percent
and inflation continued at the then substantially higher rate. Second, plaintiffs tried to comply with the formula outlined in the Trilogy cases. The expert witnesses were required by those cases to
value the property as if they were in a "hypothetical housing market where supply and demand are in equilibrium" 90-whatever
that phrase means. None of the witnesses had done any such
thing before and the appraisal results apparently did not impress
the judges. The court said that such valuations would have to be
based on comparable sales in other towns without rent control or
in the town in question before there was rent control because "rent
control would not be necessary if the housing market were in equilibrium."91 Since the witnesses did not base their appraisals on
any such comparable sales, the result did not comply with the requirements laid down in the earlier cases. Further, the court
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 626, 350 A.2d at 45.
Id. at 626, 350 A.2d at 45-46 (citation omitted).
78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978).
Id. at 215, 394 A.2d at 72.
Id.
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noted, laying the foundation of comparability would be "difficult
and expensive" 92 and so it gave up on using value as the basis for
control as being "practically unworkable"9 3 and turned to a new
criterion using readily obtainable figures.
The court's new approach was to assume that the landlords' net
operating incomes (NOI) in 1973 were "fair," and to proscribe a
rent control system that caused too much of a decrease of that income. "At some point, steady erosion of NOI becomes confiscatory."9 4 The court did not define exactly where that point was, but

said that the one to five percent erosion of net operating incomes
from 1973 to 1976, while the Consumer Price Index went up thirty
percent, was not sufficient to be deemed confiscatory. Next, the
court took a great leap. It noted the recent high inflation and sub
silentio assumed that it would continue into the future. Under
such circumstances, the court held, "the 'average' landlord [could]
expect profits to fall for the indefinite future" 95 and this would be
confiscatory. That coupled with the fact that the procedures for
hardship relief were too slow to be effective rendered the two and
one-half percent limitation invalid. The latter provision was severable from the rest of the ordinance, however. This left effective the
prohibition on rent increases in excess of the percentage increases
in the Consumer Price Index.
There are several aspects of the New Jersey decisions that are
deserving of comment and criticism. They relate to the court's
misconceptions about economics and markets. To begin with, its
justification for rent controls is "that rents are being unfairly inflated as a result of failure in the free operation of the rental housing market-e.g., housing shortages, monopoly power, etc."96 That
statement contains a number of doubtful premises which should
be explored. One is that numerous landlords of thousands of
dwellings in a residential market have monopoly power. Of
course, it is monopoly power that justifies price regulation in the
public utility area. But the court nowhere states how it concludes
landlords have such power in view of their great number. The monopoly notion at first blush therefore seems absurd. Professor
Curtis Berger has argued that there is a quasi-monopoly in the residential market because of the relative immobility of the tenant
who must pay substantial costs in order to move and who will
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 223, 394 A.2d at 76 (footnote omitted).
95. Id.
96. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604,

623, 350 A.2d 34, 44 (1975).
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thereby be impelled to stay if the landlord increases the rent. 97 To
talk about tenant immobility in a country where twenty percent of
the families move every year and a much greater proportion of tenants does so is questionable to say the least. If American landlords
have monopolies, then competition does not exist in any place in
the economy.
A second doubtful premise is that "unfairly" high rents are a
result of "market failure."9 8 The function of a market is to balance
supply and demand through the pricing mechanism. If prices go
down, more persons will demand the good and less will be supplied. If prices go up, more persons will be induced to produce and
supply the good and fewer will demand it. Increased supply resulting from higher prices will in the long run tend to keep the
price down. Increasing rents therefore are not the result of market
failure but represent the normal functioning of the market whose
purpose is to keep supply and demand in balance. To call such
rents "unfair" and therefore limit them is to cause the very imbalances that the regulators seek to prevent. By limiting rents more
persons will be induced to use more space than they would if the
price were higher and fewer landlords will be induced to build new
housing. The result is a "housing shortage" which nobody wants
to remedy-witness New York City. The court's statement that
housing shortages are caused by market failure has it just backwards. It is the operation of the market that will in the long run
increase housing supply, and it is rent control that will in the long
run cause suppliers to refrain from building more housing.
A related error in the court's opinions is its proposed reliance
for valuation on a hypothetical market "in which the supply of
available rental housing is just adequate to meet the needs of the
various categories of persons actively desiring to rent apartments
in the municipality." 99 This betrays the very same misunderstanding about markets. The premise of the "hypothetical market" is
that it is only with such a situation that the supply of and demand
for local housing would be in balance. That is just not true. Again,
it is the function of the pricing mechanism of any market to keep
supply and demand in balance, and that is exactly what existed in
the New Jersey housing market when rent controls were adopted.
Huge numbers of people were not living on the streets in that
state. It was not the imbalance of the market that rent control advocates abhorred but the increasing rents. What rent control does
is to prevent the market's pricing mechanism from reducing effec97. C. Berger, supra note 2, at 239.
98. Troy Hills Village v. Township Council of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 68 N.J. 604,
623, 350 A.2d 34, 44 (1975).
99. Id. at 624, 350 A.2d at 44.
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tive demand and inducing additional supply. Seen in this light, the
court's remark that since vacancy rates dropped under Fort Lee's
rent control ordinance, this provides a rational basis for continued
rent control,100 is absurd. Naturally vacancy rates dropped as
rents were artificially held down. If the untoward results of rent
control provide a legal argument for its continuance, then we are
indeed in a sad state.
One other point about the court's opinions ought to be mentioned. At one place it said that valuation of the properties is difficult because "[i]n practice, unfortunately, arms'-length sales of
rent controlled apartment buildings are rare."' 0 Why does the
court think that such sales are rare? Does it occur to the judges
that there are very few investors who want to own apartment
buildings that are subject to rent controls, and therefore there is
not much of a market to buy or construct them? And would this
not in the long run mean less rental housing? In answer, one
should concede that that is probably not a reason for a court to
strike down rent controls, but it certainly should be a reason for a
legislative body not to enact them in the first place.
4. Eviction Control
Rent control is invariably accompanied by some form of eviction control. This was true of the federal controls during World
War II and it is just as true of today's local ordinances. The reason
for this is clear. Most residential tenancies are short, i.e., month to
month or at most a year in duration. If the landlord could evict the
tenant at the expiration of the term, this would give him tremendous leverage to extract a higher unlawful rent in return for renewal. Thus, rent control would be unworkable without
controlling the right to refuse renewal. As Mr. Justice Holmes said
02
"The preference given to the tenant in possesin Block v. Hirsh:1
sion is an almost necessary incident of the policy [to limit landlords to reasonable rents] and is traditional in English law. If the
tenant remained subject to the landlord's power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlord's demands would fail."
Typically then a rent control ordinance prevents a landlord
from evicting his tenant even at the expiration of the term except
for certain reasons specifically described in the law. Such reasons
often include: (1) failure to pay rent; (2) tenant's violation of
other obligations of the lease; (3) tenant's commission of a nui100. Hehmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 210, 394 A.2d 65, 69 (1978).
101. Id. at 214, 394 A.2d at 72.
102. 256 U.S. 135, 157-58 (1921).
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sance; (4) landlord's desire to occupy the premises himself; and
(5) landlord's desire to abandon or demolish the property.
Under these laws, the landlord no longer can exercise the same
kind of control over the identity of his tenantry as he could at common law. In these circumstances, it is not much of an overstatement to say that once a person has rented property for a month, he
is in effect entitled to an estate for his life if he pays the lawful rent
and does nothing culpable with respect to the leased property.
The inextricable relationship between regulation of rents and
evictions is demonstrated in the recent, apparently revolutionary,
eviction control statute in New Jersey.103 The new statute is unlike most rent control laws whose primary mechanism is control of
rents by an administrative agency aided by a set of rules prohibiting eviction except for cause. Rather, New Jersey's new law prohibits evictions except for good cause, and then, as an adjunct, in
effect sets up a rent control program administered by the regular
courts if there is no system of local rent control. It does this by
prescribing as good cause for eviction a failure "to pay rent after a
valid notice to quit and notice of increase of said rent, provided the
increase in rent is not unconscionable and complies with any and
all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases."10 4 Another related good cause is the situation where
"[t]he landlord or owner proposes, at the termination of a lease,
reasonable changes of substance in the terms and conditions of the
lease ... which the tenant, after written notice, refuses to
accept."105
Since the statute sets up no machinery for determining what is
an unconscionable or unreasonable rent increase where there is
no local rent ordinance, it is the courts who will have to decide that
question on a case by case basis. What the statute did was to set
up through the backdoor a state-wide court-administered rent control system. However, since so many towns in New Jersey already
have local rent and eviction control, it may be that the rent control
aspect of the state law will not be used all that much. Certainly the
cases that have been officially reported under the Act thus far have
not involved rent disputes, with just one exception; and that case
involved an HUD financed project where rent controls were feder106
ally preempted.
103.
104.
105.
106.

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-18-61.1 to -61.5 (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 2A.18-61.1(f).
Id. § 2A.18-61.1(i).
Hill Manor Apartments v. Brome, 164 N.J. Super. 295, 395 A.2d 1307 (Essex
County Ct. 1978).
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5. Policy Analysis of Rent Control
a.

Fairness

I use as the fundamental criterion for the fairness of these new
regulatory impositions, such as rent control, the question of
whether the law is operating upon the landlord in a retroactive or
unexpected way. If it is not, then the landlord will be in a position
to protect himself by bargaining on terms with the tenant, or by an
upward adjustment of rent in exchange for the new right, or in
some other fashion. But if the law operates in such a way that the
tenant is unexpectedly or retroactively granted substantial new
rights, and the landlord is by circumstances or design prevented
from recouping losses caused by the newly created disadvantage,
this may be said to be unfair to him. This expectation notion of
fairness was recently more fully developed in my article on takings, 0 7 and is based partially on Edmund Cahn's ruminations
about the sense of injustice in his famous book.108
Can rent control be said to be in that sense unfair to landlords?
It seems that the answer to that question should depend upon
what law existed or was reasonably expected at the time the landlord originally invested in his property. If rent control existed or
was contemplated at that time, the price he paid for the property
would reflect that, and it would be difficult to argue that rent control was an unfair imposition upon him. But where there was no
rent control and none was contemplated at the time of his investment, he would have paid a full price for the asset and a subsequent enactment of such a law would seem to be most unfair. In
the long run, therefore, it would appear that a well-established set
of rent controls would be discounted in the market by lower prices
paid for purchase of rental property and the landlord could and
would avoid any unfairness arguably stemming from the law.
b.

Economic Efficiency

As a matter of economic efficiency, rent controls are much more
suspect, however, as the foregoing discussion of the case law on
the subject demonstrates. Several additional points should be
made as well. First, it is ironic that price control in the form of
numerous rent control ordinances and statutes has been recently
imposed on the very sector of the economy that has shown the lowest rate of inflation of the major components of the Consumer
Price Index. 0 9 The trend toward rent control is nevertheless un107. See L. Berger, A PolicyAnalysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 165,
166-69 (1974).
108. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUsTICE 13-22 (1949).

109. From the 1967 base period to November, 1980, the Consumer Price Index went
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mistakable and it is strong. A number of factors explain this, but I
would suggest that the major explanation lies in the fact that the
market for rental properties is local and therefore subject to relatively effective local regulation. In contrast, if the consumers in
the town of X are unhappy with the rising price of food, there is no
way they can effectively procure laws which will relieve their problem. If the town were to freeze the prices the local food stores
could charge, the latter would continue in business for only a very
short time. As soon as their costs exceeded their revenues they
would be inclined to close down and their customers would travel
to a neighboring town to buy food at market prices. Local price
regulation of items traded on a national market could not possibly
be effective.
But where the market is local-in the sense that the thing to be
sold cannot be moved in response to higher prices elsewhere-local price regulation is feasible. It is the feasibility of local rent control that explains its rapid growth. Consumers, frustrated by their
inability to keep up with the rising cost of living, naturally turn to
local government to solve those problems it is capable of solving.
Wherever tenants form a large percentage of the local population,
local officeholders are subject to pressure for rent control. And as
already noted, a large number of municipalities have recently responded affirmatively, especially in a few of the larger states.
What will continued rent control bring to these American cities
in the long run? The answer is demonstrated in New York City,
Britain, Paris and elsewhere. Though keeping price down does not
restrict housing supply in the short run because the buildings are
already in existence, the long run effects are devastating. Very few
investors want to build housing for rental in a rent-controlled environment when they can invest in uncontrolled sectors of the economy. For example, as a result of rent control in Britain the private
rental sector declined from sixty-one percent of the dwellings in
1947, to only fourteen percent in 1977.110 Private investment in
rental housing other than luxury units has practically ceased
there. The government is now the builder of rental housing in Britain, as it must be in any economy where rent control continues to
discourage private investment. In Paris, rent-controlled apartments were vacated only when the occupants died, and it is said
that for many young couples "the wife's major activity consist[ed]
so that she could find a vacated
of watching out for deaths"'
apartment.
up 148% while the rental component thereof went up 92%. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR.
110. See Utt, supra note 53, at 88.
111. Id.
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Besides helping to create shortfalls in construction, rent controls tend to increase the dilapidation and abandonment of rental
property as increasing costs narrow the landlord's margin of return'
and make continued maintenance or operation unprofitable. In addition, rent controls encourage the inefficient allocation of housing
by causing persons to stay in larger premises than they need after
reduction in the size of their family.
Finally, it can be argued that since rent control makes operation
of housing relatively unprofitable, it will cause owners to take the
housing off the rental market and sell it to owner-occupants. This
occurs not only with respect to single-family dwellings but also to
large buildings where condominium conversion is becoming more
and more of a problem. That is not to say that such conversions
take place only where there is rent control; that is not true. They
take place wherever operation of rental housing is unprofitable
and there is a strong market for owner-occupied housing. Nevertheless, a rent-controlled environment creates a strong incentive
toward taking properties off the rental market. For those interested in achieving both high quality and quantity of rental housing, such a result must be seen as terribly destructive.
C. Control of Entry Into and Withdrawal From the Market Versus
Condominium Conversion Legislation
1.

The Background

Public utilities are regulated with respect to who may enter or
withdraw from a given market. The requirement of a franchise, license, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is the
means used to control entry. Several justifications for this type of
2
regulation have been stated by Professor Kahn.11
First, where the industry is a natural monopoly, the customers
can be served at the lowest cost by one firm or a very limited
number of firms. If unrestricted entry were allowed, there would
be "cycles of excessive investment followed by destructive rivalry"" 3 which would drive prices so low that the companies
would not be able to maintain their equipment or give adequate
service.
Second, most public utilities need eminent domain to perform
their services-railroads need roadbeds and electric companies
need easements to run lines-and government must dispense this
112. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS

2-11 (1971). This book serves as the source for the discussion of public utility
regulation contained in the text.
113. Id. at 2.
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power in such a way as to eliminate wasteful duplication. This justification is really a derivative of the notion of natural monopolythat it is more efficient to have one entity tear up the streets than
ten.
Other perhaps less important reasons have been posed by Professor Kahn for entry regulation: (1) to encourage private investment in a highly risky field by giving a monopoly; (2) to limit the
entry into a field to those with sufficient skill; (3) to prevent discriminatory pricing; and (4) to prevent entry into only the lucrative markets.
There is as yet no completely analogous regulation of entry into
the landlord business. Of course land use controls can and do affect whether an owner can build rental housing on a particular parcel. But aside from such indirect methods, there is no real
regulation of a person's right to rent out his property. Certainly if
one examines the above-mentioned justifications for entry regulation of public utilities, no reason appears for similar regulation of
landlords.
The right of a public utility to withdraw service from customers
is often regulated. The major justification is that once a monopoly
is granted to a particular company it is unfair for it to serve only
the profitable portion of the market; rather, in return for its government-granted monopoly, its obligation is to serve all in the market
needing the service. Thus, airlines and railroads historically have
been ordered to continue services to places or types of activities
they would have preferred to abandon.
The situation in the landlord-tenant area analogous to regulation of withdrawal would be a governmental attempt to prevent a
landlord from withdrawing his property from the rental market.
This has actually occurred in two situations: (1) where a landlord
seeks to evict, purportedly to take the property off the market, but
really as a means of retaliation for the tenant's reporting of code
violations; and (2) regulation of condominium conversions. The
first item is of relatively little importance. There are a few cases
that in effect prevent a landlord from taking his property off the
rental market when used as a pretext for "getting even" with his
tenant.114 The second item is of great interest, and in the scheme
of things, more important. It involves the general question of
whether an owner may decide to stop renting his property and to
offer it for sale to owner-occupants without stringent regulation of
such activity. The answer increasingly given by the law is that he
114. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Silberg v.
Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (Union County Ct. 1971).
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may not, as my discussion of anti-condominium conversion legislation will show.
2. Anti-Condominium Conversion Legislation"5
In the past five years, there has been a tremendous growth in
the number of conversions of rental apartments to condominium
ownership. It has been estimated by Advance Mortgage Corporation that there were 45,000 such conversions in 1977, 85,000 in 1978,
145,000 in 1979, and 160,000 in 1980.116 The hot pace continued
through 1980, but the money shortage and high interest rates of the
past months may have slowed the activity. However, it is expected
that when money becomes more readily available at reasonable
rates, the volume will pick up to even higher levels.
A number of factors have contributed to the remarkable growth
of this activity. Ever tightening rules about depreciation and depreciation recapture have made purchases of rental housing less
attractive for tax purposes, thus reducing the apartment resale7
market. In addition, rental income has not kept up with costs."
Since the resale price of rental property is completely tied to, and
is a function of, the amount of net operating income that the property earns and since net operating incomes have been decreasing,
additional downward pressure has been placed on the value of
rental property. Rent control has exacerbated this problem. It is
estimated that in New York City, the value of rent-controlled
buildings has declined from about six to eight times annual rents
to about one and one-half times." 8 Even where there is no rent
control, however, the price that a building can bring subdivided as
a condominium has averaged about one and one-half to two times
115. On this general subject see U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUIMS AND COOPERATIVES
(1980), reprinted in G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL
HOUSING 122 (1981); Wynn, Condominium Conversion and Tenant RightsWisconsin Statutes Section 703.08: What Kind of Protection Does It Really
Provide?, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 73 (1979); Comment, Conversion of Apartments to
Condominiums: Social and Economic Regulations Under the California
Subdivision Map Act, 16 CAL. W.L REV. 466 (1980); Comment, The Regulation
of Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FoRDHAm URB. U.J. 507 (1980); Note, The
Validity of OrdinancesLimiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L REV.
124 (1979); Note, Condominium Conversion Legislation: Limitation on Use or
Deprivation of Rights?-A Re-examination, 15 NEw ENG. LJ REV. 815 (1980);
Note, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums and Cooperatives:
Protecting Tenants in New York, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 705 (1975).
116. See 2 Real Est. Outlook 1 (May 1980); Telephone interview with Advance
Mortgage Corp.
117. See note 109 supra.
118. See Utt, supra note 53, at 90.
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the price that it can bring as the sale of rental property." 9 This
economic fact is perhaps the biggest single factor leading toward
condominium conversions. In addition, new trends protective of
tenants, e.g., strict habitability enforcement, anti-eviction laws,
and tenant unions, have made being a landlord less attractive than
ever.
While all this has been going on, there has continued to be a
huge demand for owner-occupied housing. The advantages of
home ownership include the income tax deductibility of real estate
taxes and mortgage interest, the possible appreciation in value of
the house, protection from inflation in rents, and the right to permanent control of the property. With prices of single-family dwellings escalating out of sight, the lower prices that condominium
housing commands has made the latter most attractive as an alternative means of owning a home. The confluence of the two factors
of increased financial incentives to market the apartments and increased demand for them has made condominium conversion one
of the remarkable new developments of the seventies and eighties.
This trend, as might have been expected, has not been an unmixed blessing. Every time a rental apartment unit is converted
and sold to a non-tenant, a tenant is forced out of his dwelling. Of
course the person buying it is vacating housing as well, so any
claims that a housing shortage is being created by conversions are
patently absurd. Nevertheless, a decrease in the overall amount of
rental housing does result, unless new construction makes up for
the loss, and very little such construction has been going on. So it
is fair to say that conversions do adversely affect the supply of
rental housing and this hits particularly hard those of lower income in our society who cannot afford to buy the property they
rent. Even tenants who can afford to and do buy their apartments
have grievances however. Many are unwilling buyers who
purchase because of their fear of eviction. Moreover, the monthly
payments they are required to make on the new mortgages financing the purchases often are one and one-half to three times higher
20
than their former rents, even after substantial down payments.1
Inevitably, then, tenants have brought political pressure upon
federal, state, and local government for measures to slow down or
even to stop the conversions. The response has been a large
number of laws at all three levels designed in different ways to
119. See 2 Real Est. Outlook 1 (May 1980); Note, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums and Cooperatives: ProtectingTenants in New York, 8 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 705 (1975).
120. See Rugaber, Condominium Trend Cuts Rental Market, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28,

1974, at 1, col. 5.
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stem the tide.121 These laws fall into a number of categories:
(1) The Moratorium. Typically, such legislation is passed to
give the governing entity enough time to study the conversion
problem so that other effective laws can be passed. In 1979
Chicago passed a forty day moratorium 22 and Philadelphia an
eighteen month one.123 The latter city, at the same time, enacted a
number of other measures protective of tenants of condominium
converters.
(2) Relocation Assistance and Payments. A number of jurisdictions have provided that the converter must assist tenants displaced by the conversion to find housing and pay them either the
cost of moving or a fixed sum in lieu thereof.124 A New Jersey statute requires that the converter upon request "shall offer to the tenant, personally or through an agent, the rental of comparable
housing and a reasonable opportunity to examine and rent such
comparable housing."'125 No tenant can be removed without three
years' notice126 and without proving the above offer was made.
The tenant is entitled to up to five one-year stays of eviction until
the court is satisfied that the tenant has been offered the comparable housing. After the first one-year stay, the landlord can avoid
the offer requirement and further stays by paying the tenant five
months' rent. 2 7 But under New Jersey law, the three-year notice
provision delays conversion against an unwilling tenant for a very
substantial time.
(3) Right of First Refusal. Some legislation requires that the
tenant be given a right of first refusal with respect to the apart121. The state and local laws will be discussed below. In 1980 Congress passed the
Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act. Condominium and Coop-

erative Abuse Relief Act of 1980, 15 U.S.CA. §§ 3601-3616 (West Supp. 1975-

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

1980). The Act is hortatory only and will not be elsewhere discussed in this
article. The act merely recommends that state and local law provide tenants
with notice and opportunity to purchase. Id. § 3605. There is continuing pressure for stronger federal legislation including a two year absolute moratorium on all conversions.
Chicago, l1l., Temporary Moratorium on Condominium Conversion (March
21, 1979), noted in Comment, The Regulation of Rental Apartment Conversions, 8 FoRDaAm Urm. LJ. 507, 517 n.46 (1979-1980).
PHMLADELPHIA, PA., CODE §§ 9-1201 to -1208 (1979), noted in Comment, supra
note 122, at 517 n.46.
See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 47.06, noted in Comment, supra note 122,
at 561 n.351. This Act requires relocation assistance or payment of $2500 in
lieu thereof to "qualified tenants" as defined. Id.
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A.18-61.11 (West Supp. 1980).
Id. § 2A.18-61.2(g).
Id. § 2A.18-61.11.
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ment he occupies, but makes no attempt to affect the price. Virginia has such a statute, giving the tenant sixty days after notice to
decide whether to purchase.128 California 12 9 and Florida]30 have
similar provisions.
(4) Limitation on Number of Conversions. Some jurisdictions
limit the number of conversions that may take place. For example,
a San Francisco ordinance limits the number of rental units that
may be converted in a year to 1,000.131 Other jurisdictions forbid
rate for relevant rentals falls below a
conversions if the vacancy
132
certain percentage.
(5) Tenant PurchaseRequirements. Under the laws of certain
jurisdictions, a required percentage of tenants must agree to
purchase their apartments before the eviction of non-purchasing
tenants will be permitted. New York City has the best known such
provision. The details differ according to whether the apartment
comes under the local "rent control" or "rent stabilization" ordinance; but the major provisions are similar. Under the city's rent
control ordinance, 33 in order for a conversion plan to be declared
effective by the Attorney General, at least thirty-five percent of the
tenants in possession must agree to purchase their apartments.
After the plan is declared effective, the non-purchasing tenants are
given rights of first refusal at the previously offered terms, or if the
later terms are more favorable, at those terms. A non-purchasing
tenant has substantial long-term protection, in that after his apartment is sold, he cannot be evicted for the next two years unless
eighty percent of the apartments in the building have been sold to
tenants. Tenants age sixty-two or older are given special protection against eviction by state statute.
Converters can avoid the thirty-five percent rule by going to a
non-eviction plan. Under this option, which is not specifically provided for by law, they can convert apartments to condominiums
but may not evict non-purchasing tenants. Buildings under this
128. VA. CODE § 55-79.94 (1981).
129. CAi. Gov'T CODE § 66427.1(a) (West Supp. 1966-1980).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.612 (West Supp. 1980).
131. SAN FRANCISCO CAL., MUN. CODE art. 9, § 1396 (1979), noted in Comment,
supra note 122, at 561 n.349.
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1281(b) (1) (B) (Supp. V 1978) (vacancy rate of the building three percent or less); Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 125.2(F6) (1979) (vacancy rate of the planning area in which property is located five percent or
less), noted in Comment, Conversion of Apartments to Condominiums: Socialand Economic Regulationsunder the CaliforniaSubdivision Map Act, 16
Cal. W.. Rev. 466, 490 nn.122 & 123 (1980).
133. NEW YoRK, N.Y., ADmq. CODE §§ Y 51-1.0 to -18.0 (1975 & Supp. 1979), noted in
Comment, supra note 122, at 544 n.236.
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plan tend to remain hybrid, as many tenants choose to stay in their
apartments.
3. Policy Analysis of Condominium Conversion Legislation
a. Fairness
It should be observed initially that some of the minor anti-conversion laws do not really harm owners to any great degree. The
short moratorium probably does no substantial damage except to
the extent that it enables the regulators to prepare and pass more
onerous laws. And it is hard to argue that owners are hurt by provisions that give the present tenant some notice and a right of first
refusal to buy his dwelling at the market price. After all, the owner
is getting his price. The only parties who could arguably be damaged would be the indefinite universe of non-tenants who might
desire to buy the tenant's apartment. But their claim seems relatively tenuous, and first refusal seems a thoroughly justifiable kind
of regulation.
Some of the other laws, however, impose very large costs. Consider the ones requiring that the converter pay moving costs to the
evicted tenant.134 The converter must pay even though the tenant's term is up, and he, in the past, would have had no right to
stay beyond his term. This kind of regulation relates to the previously mentioned trend in rent-controlled areas to give essentially a
life estate to all residential tenants who perform their lease obligations faithfully. In the conversion case, it might appear at first
glance as if the cost of relocation were being shifted from the tenant to the converter. However, this might not necessarily be true.
Depending upon the extent of competition between condominium
conversion properties and other properties for sale, it might be
possible for the converter to shift the cost to the apartment buyer
by increasing price. The question then becomes: who ought to
bear the cost of the tenant's relocation, the converter, his purchaser, or the tenant himself?
As a matter of fairness or equity, the answer should depend
upon what the reasonable expectations of the tenant were upon
the original leasing. If the relocation expense law was on the
books at that time, and if the rents charged in the locality reflect
that additional cost of operation (that is, there is no rent control),
it would not be unfair to require the landlord to pay for relocation.
If no such law existed or if such a law existed but was accompanied by rent control, it would be unfair to charge the landlord for
the tenant's relocation costs because the former would not have
been in a position to charge increased rentals in return for that
134. See notes 124-27 & accompanying text supra.
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right, and he might not be able to recoup such costs from a buyer
in a very competitive market.
The same analysis would apply to the other stringent regulations such as the tenant purchase requirements or the limitation
on the number of conversions in a year. Again, if the law were in
effect at the time the lease was entered into, and if the rents
charged were permitted to reflect the additional rights granted by
that law, it probably should not be considered unfair to allow the
law to operate. All of the above discussion rests, of course, on two
premises: (1) that rents are not controlled, and (2) that rents will
rise if the law grants additional rights to tenants limiting the owner's right to convert. The second point may be doubtful for the
short run, because the supply of rental housing is already on the
market, and raising rents would be difficult if more tenants are not
seeking housing. On the other hand even in the short run, there
might be more new households choosing to rent rather than to buy
because the rights of tenants were being substantially increased
by the law; rents therefore might be raised. In the long run, there
is little doubt that rents would increase as a result of these anticonversion laws. In the face of such statutes, fewer persons would
be induced to construct rentals and this would limit supply. At the
same time, renting would be more attractive to persons seeking
housing and this would increase demand. In the long run, therefore, it is difficult to argue that these laws are "unfair" to landlords
unless they are accompanied by rent controls.
b.

Economic Efficiency

I will turn now to an analysis of the condominium conversion
laws as a matter of economic efficiency. For the purpose of discussion assume the following facts. 0 is the owner of an apartment
building with 100 units. Each apartment yields a rent of $400 per
month. Total gross rents are therefore $480,000 per annum. As a
rental building the property is worth $4,000,000. However, as individual apartments the property is worth $60,000 per apartment or
$6,000,000. Assume further that if tenants in the building must
move, their relocation costs would be $1,000 each or a total of
$100,000.
A useful analysis of the general problem of efficiency and appropriate remedies was developed by Professor Calabresi in a recent article.135 If one applied that analysis to a dispute between a
condominium converter and his tenants, four possible combinations of remedy would appear. First, the owner might have the ab135. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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solute right to evict the tenant at the expiration of his term,
enforceable by an action for possession. Under this approach, the
tenant, in order to stay, would have to pay a price satisfactory to
the owner. That is, he would have to pay whatever the market
would require for the right he desired. This, of course, was the
traditional approach of the law, under which the tenant had absolutely no right to stay beyond the expiration of his term and an
action for possession against him lay if he failed to vacate. Second,
the law might say that the owner has the right to his property, but
enforceable only by a suit for damages. In effect, the tenant could
stay as tenant by paying what a court would say was the value of
his possession. The true ultimate result of this rule would be to
allow the tenant a right to "condemn" a right to rent the property
for his life. This is very close to what the law now is in those localities having rent and eviction control laws where the tenant may
not be evicted except for cause and rents are strictly regulated by
law.
A third possible view would give the tenant a specifically enforceable right to stay on the property. This is a remedy analogous
to the first alternative, except here the owner could rid himself of
the tenant only by paying what the latter demanded-again a market transaction. Lastly, the law might be that the tenant has a
right to stay, but the only remedy he would have for being physically evicted by the owner would be damages for injury to his right
of possession.
Specifically enforceable rights which can be overturned only by
a market transaction, as in alternatives one and three, Calabresi
calls property entitlements. Rights that are enforceable only
through a court's determination of value and an award of that
value in money, as in alternatives two and four, Calabresi calls liability entitlements.
To those trained in the received tradition of property law, alternatives three and four might seem on their face to be almost preposterous as possible views of what the rules might be; but they
are not. Indeed, alternative four is the rule adopted in a number of
jurisdictions, in effect giving the tenant the right to overstay his
term, his remedy for
breach being a right to recover the expenses
6
of his relocation.13
The third alternative seems at first blush even more absurd.
But in effect, it is the law in New York City. You will recall that
under New York's rule, thirty-five percent of the tenants must
purchase their dwellings before the Attorney General will declare
a conversion plan effective, and without such declaration, no ten136. See notes 124-27 & accompanying text supra.
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ant may be evicted from his dwelling. 137 Thus, in order to have a
plan in which an apartment purchaser may be assured that he can
evict the occupant and thereby use it himself, a very substantial
number of the tenants in the building must purchase. It is perfectly obvious that this gives a huge amount of leverage to those
tenants who can effectively block the conversion by refusing to
purchase. And what a position to be in! They live in rent-controlled premises with rents much lower than the market would
command. They thus have every incentive to want to continue as
tenants. And they can block the conversion to owner-occupied
housing if they will just refuse to purchase. The result is that they
have a right to stay on the premises where the owner can get rid of
them only by paying what they can command in the market. In
this particular case what they can so command is a much lower
purchase price than others would have to pay in order to buy the
premises. They can get this lower price because they are not in a
competitive market, but rather in an artificially created monopsonistic one. The effect of all this is that the owner will offer his
tenants a substantial discount to induce them to buy so he can
reach the thirty-five percent requirement.
Generally speaking, one would measure efficiency by determining which use of the resources would maximize their values. I can
therefore start my economic analysis of the above four remedies
with the postulate that efficiency calls for the building in the example given to be converted to condominiums because it is worth
$4,000,000 as a rental and $6,000,000 as owner-occupied housing.
This gain of $2,000,000 is much greater than the tenant relocation
costs which total $100,000. The Coase theorem 138 says that in an
unregulated market, no matter which of the four alternative remedies is declared by the law to be applicable, market forces will direct the parties toward the efficient result, unless transaction costs
are too high. Assume for purposes of discussion that transaction
costs are zero. Thus, under alternatives one and two (owner has a
right to evict tenant or to collect damages for his failure to leave),
the efficient result would clearly follow. Specific eviction relief
would directly effectuate the conversion. And even giving damages would result in the conversion. The damages to the owner
would be at least $20,000 per apartment-the difference between its
value as a rental and its value as owner-occupied housing. In that
situation, it would not be worth $20,000 (less $1,000 relocation
costs) to an individual for a right to occupy a rental dwelling for
the rest of his life with an obligation to pay the fair rental value as
rent. (Of course, if the rents are regulated and held below market,
137. See note 133 & accompanying text supra.
138. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L & ECON. 1 (1960).
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then the right to occupy would have a value in excess of the rents.)
Therefore, the parties would reach a settlement in which the owner would pay the tenant some relatively small amount, perhaps the
cost of relocation or a little more, to get him out.
The efficient result of conversion would also occur under alternative remedies three and four (tenant has a specifically enforceable right to stay on the property or can collect damages for being
evicted). Again assuming that the tenant would have a continuing
obligation to pay market rents, the right to stay on would have a
relatively small value to him, perhaps the $1,000 cost of relocation.
But it would be worth $20,000 to the owner to get rid of him and
convert. Therefore, the owner would pay him some amount between $1,000 and $20,000 to get his agreement to leave, and conversion would take place whether his rights are specifically
enforceable or just in damages.
However, if one changed the figures in the original hypothetical
so that the owner made only $2,000 per apartment by converting,
the relocation costs were the same $1,000, and the transaction costs
of negotiation and settlement were $1,500, the entire picture would
change. The efficient result of conversion would occur only when
the law followed alternatives one or two (owner has an action for
specific recovery of possession or for damages), because giving the
tenant the initial entitlement under alternatives three or four
would prevent a deal from being made. The reason is that the
$1,500 transaction costs of settlement plus the $1,000 that the tenant would likely demand for relocation as a minimum, would exceed any increase in value the owner might reap. Therefore, since
generally it is not known in advance whether the transaction costs
would exceed any economic gains, the economist would argue that
for efficiency reasons the law should choose alternative one or two
and allow the landlord the initial entitlement. The first alternative
is preferable because specific relief encourages the use of the less
expensive market transaction rather than the more expensive
court proceeding. So the common law rule allowing the landlord
recovery of his property at the expiration of a tenancy would tend
toward the efficient result. This would also suggest that the other
onerous anti-conversion regulations such as tenant purchase requirements, relocation assistance, or long delays in eviction relief,
might in many cases also frustrate economic efficiency.
I have yet to discuss in economic terms a regulation limiting the
number of conversions to an absolute annual maximum, or forbidding them where rental vacancy rates are low. These laws create
39
what Professor Calabresi would call an inalienable entitlement.1
139. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 135, at 1111-15.
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In such a case, "the law not only decides who is to own something
and what price is to be paid for it if it is taken or destroyed, but
also regulates its sale-by, for example, prescribing preconditions
for a valid sale or forbidding a sale altogether."140 As Calabresi
points out, a regulation making an entitlement inalienable may
sometimes lead to efficiency. He cites as an example a regulation
barring sale of certain realty to polluters where there are many potential injured parties; collective valuation by liability rules would
be too expensive, and it is clear that avoiding pollution is cheaper
than its costs.
In this case it is apparent that in many if not all cases where the
owner seeks conversion, making apartments inalienable by limiting the number of conversions would lead to the inefficient result.
Consider my original example where conversion would increase
values by $2,000,000 at a cost of $100,000 in relocation expenses.
Preventing conversion would have immense economic costs. And
even where the figures were $200,000 and $100,000 respectively, efficiency would call for the conversion to be made. Therefore, it is
clear that laws limiting numbers of conversions tend toward economic inefficiency.
In conclusion then, it might be said that although anti-conversion laws unaccompanied by rent and eviction controls might not
be deemed unfair to the landlord, the more stringent ones would
probably in the long run lead toward inefficiency and misallocation
of resources.
D. Regulation of Quality of Service Versus Landlord's Obligation to
Supply Habitable Premises
1. The Background
Public utility regulators have the power to prescribe rules with
respect to quality of service. Typically however, direct regulation
of quality is quite limited. As Professor Kahn notes:
But it is far more true of quality of service than of price that the primary responsibility remains with the supplying company instead of with
the regulatory agency, and that the agencies, in turn, have devoted much
more attention to the latter than to the former. The reasons for this are
fairly clear. Service standards are often much more difficult to specify by
the promulgation of rules. Where they can be specified, they are often
essentially uncontroversial. Where they cannot-and this is particularly
the case when it comes to innovations, to the dynamic improvement of
service-in a system in which the private companies do the managing and
the government the supervision, there is no choice but to leave the initiative with the company itself. The only role the regulatory commission can
typically play is a negative one-formulating minimum standards and using periodic inspections to see that they are met; investigating customer
140. Id. at 1111.
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complaints and issuing orders when service has been obviously poor,
when management or subordinates have been blatantly inefficient or unfair, or when it wishes to insist that the companies take on or retain unremunerative business.
This authority is by no means negligible. The aggressive commission
has available to it the ability to penalize offending companies by holding
permissible rates at less remunerative levels than it would otherwise be
prepared to allow-subject to the constraint, however, that it would be
self-defeating to punish them so severely as to impair their financial capacity to institute the desired improvements. And commissions frequently do use this weapon.
Still, their role is essentially a negative one and this raises fundamental questions about the efficacy of the entire process. 14 1

The analogy in landlord-tenant law is quite interesting. In
many ways regulation of quality is more detailed and stringent in
that sphere than it is in public utility law. This is not the place for
a detailed treatment of those developments, however, as it has
been done many times before. It will suffice to review them here
cursorily in outline form as a background for my policy
discussion. 142
1. Housing Codes. These are detailed codes enacted generally
on a local level. They typically regulate such things as number of
persons in occupancy, repair, ventilation, fire safety, heat, hot and
cold water, plumbing fixtures, sewage disposal, elevator service
and the like. Enforcement is usually by a local agency. They use
the following modes of enforcement:
a. An order to vacate. This may be followed by an order
to demolish if the owner does not bring the building into
compliance within a certain time. These remedies obviously
do not work in a period of housing shortage.
b. Criminal prosecutions. These result in small fines
but almost never in a jail sentence. The small fines when
paid are regarded by the landlords as a cost of doing
business.
c. Civil penalties. These are supposedly for the purpose
of extracting from the landlord the economic benefits he has
unfairly derived from the premises. The cost of prosecuting
these civil actions is so high that they have fallen into
disuse.
d. Mandatory injunction ordering the repairs. This is
141. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 46, at 22.
142. The best and most complete up-to-date review of this history may be found in
Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warrantiesof Habitabilityin
Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 1 (1979). The

outline in the text is taken from this article.
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theoretically a very effective device, but seems to be used
only in the city of Chicago.
e. Direct agency action to make repairs. This mode of
relief is authorized in a number of states, but is rarely used,
probably because of insufficient staff.
f. Receiverships. These laws authorize appointment of
a receiver to collect rents and make repairs. There is some
evidence that receiverships have been effective in Chicago.143 They were used in New York City from 1962 to 1965.
2. Rent Withholding Legislation. A number of states have
passed statutes authorizing tenants to withhold rents where there
is a serious violation of a housing code.144 Typically, rents may be
withheld only upon showing that the premises failed an inspection
by an appropriate officer. Most of the statutes require that the
rents be paid into court or to a housing agency. Some statutes allow the court or agency to use the rents to correct the violations.
3. Statutory Imposition of Warranty of Habitability. A
number of states passed statutes in the nineteenth century requiring the landlord to put residential premises in tenantable condition fit for occupation.145 These statutes gave tenants the right to
vacate the premises, or to repair and deduct the cost thereof from
the rents. Some states limited this last option to a maximum of
one month's rent.
More recently, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
Rhode Island and Wisconsin have enacted statutes simply declaring that the landlord must provide habitable dwellings at the beginning of the term. 4 6 Some statutes also provide for a continuing
duty to maintain the premises thereafter. Most of the laws do not
provide specific remedies for breach of these obligations, though
the Maine and Wisconsin statutes have some provisions on
remedy.
A large number of states have passed comprehensive new residential landlord-tenant codes based on the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act,147 (hereinafter URLTA) or the Model
Residential Landlord-Tenant Code.148 URLTA imposes duties to
143. Id. at 22-23.
144. Id. at 23-51.
145. Id. at 51-59. The states were California, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana,
Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
146. Id. at 59-65.
147. Id. at 65-74. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennes-

see, Virginia, and Washington.
148. Id. These states are Delaware and Hawaii.
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comply with applicable housing codes materially affecting health
and safety, and to make all repairs necessary to put and keep the
49
premises in fit and habitable condition.1
Professor Cunningham describes the relief available under
URLTA as follows:
The URLTA provides a wide variety of remedies if the landlord violates
any of his statutory duties with respect to the condition of the premises.
These remedies include termination of the lease if the breach materially
affects health and safety, recovery of damages, injunctive relief, the right
to repair minor defects in the dwelling unit and to deduct the cost of repairs from the rent, where there is wrongful failure to supply heat, water,
or essential services, the right to "procure reasonable amounts" of the
same "and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the rent," or "procure reasonable substitute housing during the period of the landlord's
noncompliance, in which case the tenant is excused from paying rent for
the period of... noncompliance," and use of a counterclaim for damages
based on the landlord's breach of duty as a defense to any action by the
landlord to evict the tenant or recover rent, subject to the court's power to
"order the tenant to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued and
thereafter accruing, and... determine the amount due to each party" and
to enter judgment for the tenant in an eviction action "[i]f no rent remains
due after" the net amount owing from one to the other is paid. The last
remedy implicitly authorizes the tenant to withhold rent when the landlord violates his statutory duties with respect to maintaining the leased
premises in a habitable condition. There is no provision in the URLTA for
use of withheld rents to make necessary repairs except through the tenant's "repair-and-deduct" option, and there is no provision for appointment of a receiver authorized to make necessary repairs. 1 5 0

4. Common Law Implied Warranty of Habitability.51 At least
ten jurisdictions have held that in every residential letting the
landlord impliedly warrants that the premises are habitable.15 2
The obligation is held to be breached whenever there are housing
code violations that have a substantial adverse effect on the health
or safety of the occupants. 5 3 In some states, it is apparently not
necessary that there be code violations; it is sufficient if the condition is such as to be a serious threat to health and safety. 5 4 Most
courts say that the implied warranty includes a continuing obligation to keep the premises habitable after the original letting, ex-

cept, of course, for problems created by the deliberate or negligent

conduct of the tenant. 5 5 Remedies similar to those outlined in the
discussion of URLTA have been used by the courts: viz. termination of the tenancy by leaving the premises, restitution of advance
149. UNiFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 2.104.
150. Cunningham, supra note 142, at 69-70 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 74-80.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 75.
Id. at 83-86.
Id.
Id. at 86-95.
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payments, damages in reduction of rental liability, repair and deduct, and rent withholding and abatement while continuing in
156
possession.
2. Policy Analysis of Implied Warranty of Habitability
a.

Economic Efficiency

As a matter of efficiency, the economist would argue that repairs and maintenance should be done only if they increase the
fair market value of the premises more than they cost. Thus, if
repairs cost $500 but they increase (or prevent the decrease of) the
value of the property by $1,000, the repairs are "efficient." In such
case, the tenant would not need a legal right to the repairs because
presumably the landlord would perform them anyway. Suppose,
on the other hand, that the costs were not worth the benefits derived, for example that a $1,000 repair would increase market value
only $250. In that situation, giving the tenant the right to the repairs, enforceable by specific performance or damages, would raise
the landlord's costs. The landlord would then (along with all other
landlords) seek to raise rents or get an agreement waiving the
right. Since the increase in value of the property is by hypothesis
less than the increase in rent, it is likely the tenant would choose
not to pay the additional amount but rather to waive his right to
the repairs, on the theory that the amount fair market value goes
up is a reasonable measure of the repairs' utility, and they would
not be worth the rental increase to the tenant. Thus, it would appear that the efficient result of no repair would occur no matter
whether the law required the landlord to repair or not. In summary, economic analysis would indicate that an efficient repair will
take place whether there is an implied warranty of habitability or
not, and that an inefficient one will be waived by a tenant who
would prefer lower rents to repairs that are not worth their costs.
57
But suppose the law were that the tenant had an unwaivable1
right to require the landlord to repair. This is the law in a number
of states.158 Again the efficient repairs would be made. The case of
inefficient repairs is a bit more complex. There, the landlord would
make the repairs and attempt to raise rents, assuming that he perceived that the tenant was willing, if necessary, to expend the energy and costs required to obtain specific performance from him.
But if specific performance were not available and the tenant's
only remedy for breach were damages in the form of rent abate156. Id. at 98-126.
157. This is what Calabresi calls inalienability. See Calabresi &Melamed, supra

note 135.
158. Cunningham, supra note 142, at 95-98.
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ment, the landlord would have to decide whether the cost of making the repairs was less than the probable rent reduction, and then
choose the cheaper alternative. In a particular case this might induce an inefficient repair, i.e., one whose cost did not yield a commensurate increase in property value. This would occur where the
cost of the repair was less than the projected abatement of rent.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that where the landlord
chose not to make the repair, net rents might end up the same as if
there were no implied covenant. That is, assuming there were no
rent controls, such a landlord would attempt to raise rents in anticipation of his corresponding liability for rent abatement. In summary, the economist would argue that giving the tenant an
unwaivable warranty of habitability would be either ineffective or
result in inefficient repairs if damages were the remedy, and result
in inefficient repairs if specific performance were.
b. Fairness
One could argue that the new imposition of a warranty of habitability would not be unfair to a landlord, so long as rents were not
controlled and he could recoup his higher costs by charging higher
rents. But more importantly, many feel as a matter of basic fairness to tenants that they should have a right, enforceable by law,
to expect and require a habitable dwelling. In answer, it has been
said that when they rent dwellings tenants generally know what
they are getting and are agreeing to pay a particular rent in the
light of those conditions. But that really is not a sufficient reply,
for it is clear that most tenants renting substandard housing are
not in a strong position to bargain for better housing or lower
rents. So the fairness argument remains a compelling one, and it
undoubtedly accounts for the great metamorphosis in the law that
the implied warranty of habitability represents.
Unfortunately, however, the fact that legislatures and courts
have the best of intentions and make laws whose purpose is to improve the conditions under which people live does not necessarily
mean that their goal will be achieved. Anyone who is alive and
observes the slum conditions of the large cities can tell you that
the new rules of law are still having minimal or no effect on the
serious problems of housing in this country. There have been a
number of empirical studies,159 some indicating that the laws are
159. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 62-64, 139-46 (1976); Heskin, The Warrantyof Habitability Debate: A California Case Study, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 37 (1978); Hirsch,
Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of HabitabilityLaws

Upon Rent. An Empirical Observationon the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 1116-36 (1975); Krumholz, Rent Withholding as an Aid to
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essentially ineffective and some indicating that some repairs are
induced by enforcement. But even where improvement is noted,
account must be taken of the fact that only a small proportion of
people living in substandard dwellings are availing themselves of
the law. No one has observed that substantial across-the-board improvements in living conditions have occurred as a result of
changes in the law. That is not to say that the implied warranty is
completely worthless. As a hortatory expression of national purpose it may have some value. But none should be under the illusion that we will really solve housing problems by common-law
measures. And economic analysis should give us some pause
about whether undisclaimable warranties might not do more harm
than good if uneconomic repairs are induced.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Certainly if it was fair to say that the old law had a bias in favor
of landlords, it is equally fair to say that the new law has the opposite orientation. Those who have said that landlords are regulated
much as public utilities are, certainly have a point. Rent control,
anti-condominium conversion laws, and regulation of quality of
housing all are evidence of that. But labelling the regulations in
that fashion does not begin to answer the question of whether they
tend to reach toward the goals of fairness and efficiency.
From the standpoint of fundamental fairness, these regulations
probably are acceptable so long as rents can be raised to accommodate newly created rights. And even rent control itself would in
the long run pass a fairness test as investors discount its effect in
the price they pay for rental property. But the short-run effect of
Housing Code Enforcement, 25 J. HOUSING 242 (1969); Mosier & Soble, Modern
Legislation, Metropolitan Court Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit's
Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. iWm. J.L REF. 8 (1973); Rose & Scott, "Street
Talk"Summonses in Detroit'sLandlord-Tenant Court: A Small Step Forward
for Urban Tenants, 52 J.URB. I 967 (1975); Note, The Great Green Hope: The
Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729 (1976);
Comment, The Pennsylvania Project-A Practical Analysis of the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act, 17 VJLI.L RE v. 821, 860-85 (1972).
The Abbott study of Boston did indicate that rent abatement was probably
effective where raised as a defense and might trigger some repair. However
Mosier and Soble's, as well as Rose and Scott's study of Detroit indicated the
change in law had very little effect in tenancy actions. The Sanford study
indicated similar results in San Francisco. On the other hand, the Heskin
study of Southern California found that where complaints were made to legal
services' lawyers, repairs were made in 80% of the cases.
The point that must be recognized with respect to those studies indicating
some increase in repair as a result of habitability laws is that the vast majority of tenants never seek any legal recourse, and substantial change in their
living conditions is not occurring.
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rent control is grossly unfair to landlords who had no expectation
of its passage and paid a price accordingly.
The regulations badly fail on efficiency grounds. Rent control in
the long run will lead to less rental housing construction, more
abandonments of existing marginal housing, and may induce the
otherwise uneconomic sale of better housing to owner-occupants.
Stringent anti-contdominium conversion laws will frustrate efficiency by preventing in some cases a rational reallocation of resources to their more valuable uses. Habitability laws might cause
inefficient repairs to be made where the tenants' rights are
unwaivable.
Taken together, the rules represent an attempt by government
to insure that there will be available a large supply of habitable
rental housing at affordable costs to tenantry. To a great extent
the laws are self-defeating. It is likely that as a result of them
there will be less rental housing and that certainly means higher
rents. What this probably portends for the long run is more state
intervention in the housing market. Government may offer more
subsidies or it may well become the major rental housing supplier
of last resort. For those of us who regard government ownership
and management of enterprise a horror, this is indeed a depressing
prospect.

